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14
Entrepreneurship and innovation by actors in the market for non-timber forest products (NTFPs) cannot be fully 15 understood without a proper understanding of the position and behaviour of actors in the value chain of NTFPs. This 16 paper places the market for NTFPs in the emerging literature on value chains which has, so far, lacked a detailed 17 analysis of NTFPs. Our analysis reveals that certain key entrepreneurs are a driving force of success throughout several 18 NTFP value chains in both Bolivia and Mexico. Where market information is scarce, e.g. where producers are distant 19 from consumers, key entrepreneurs often govern entire value chains.
20
We argue that certain entrepreneurs are key to spreading success throughout the value chains of selected NTFPs 21 offsetting potential negative consequences such as exploitation of more upstream actors (e.g. collectors and processors) 22 in the value chains. Typical examples include the shopkeeper/organisation in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, who sources woven 23 palm products from and supports several producers, and the entrepreneur in Mexico who established links between 24 mushroom pickers in rural communities and brokers and consumers in Japan. Rather than criticising the monopolistic 25 position of individuals, it is important to understand how the activity of key entrepreneurs can be supported in 26 spreading successful commercialisation further and where necessary control negative impacts of their role. Our analysis 27 indicates that policies to support commercialisation of the case study NTFPs would also need to be tailored to each 28 value chain. 
32
The paper presents an analysis of non-timber 33 forest product (NTFP) 1 commercialisation using 34 value chain analysis as used, e.g. by Gereffi (1999) . 35 The analysis is useful in determining the importance 36 of key individuals in driving entrepreneurship and 37 innovation in the market for NTFPs. Understanding 38 these issues in turn is required for the design of 39 appropriate policies and development interventions, 40 which are often based on the assumption that poor 41 and politically powerless extractors suffer from high 42 levels of exploitation by intermediaries (Neumann and 43 Hirsch, 2000) .
44
Value chain analysis is a methodology which is 45 different from other market chain analysis methodol-46 ogies such as the chain analysis advanced by Porter 47 (1985) . Porter also analysed value chains, the activ-48 ities within and around a firm, but focused on the 49 analysis of the competitiveness of a particular firm. 50 Global value chain analysis does not focus on the 51 competitiveness of a particular firm, but rather on 52 how relations amongst firms are governed, i.e. on 53 the efficiency of the chain as a whole.
54
Value chain analysis is emerging as a useful tool 55 that has already led to new practical insights in the 56 markets for textiles and clothing (Gereffi, 1999) , 57 fresh fruits and vegetables (Dolan et al., 1999) , 58 commodities such as tea and coffee, and wooden 59 furniture in the case of the forestry sector (Kaplinsky 60 et al., 2003) . Recent developments in value chain 61 analysis relate to describing a typology of govern-62 ance in value chains, the factors that explain this 63 typology (Gereffi et al., 2003) 2 Porter distinguishes between primary activities concerned with delivering a product (inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and services) and support activities (procurement, human resource management, technology development, and infrastructure). The costs or competitiveness of the firm depends on its ability to manage linkages between all of these activities.
1 For the purposes of this paper, we define non-timber forest products as natural products (excluding animal or wood-based products) collected from more or less managed forest resources and, in some cases, with a proportion harvested from cultivated sources. 
143
Governance of value chains relates to the type of 144 coordination amongst dispersed but linked production 145 systems. Gereffi (1999) introduced two different types 146 of governance in value chains (which he called com-147 modity chains). Buyers undertake coordination in 148 bbuyer-drivenQ value chains, while producers play a 149 key role in bproducer-drivenQ value chains. Buyer-150 driven chains refer to industries in which large retai-151 lers, marketers and branded manufacturers play the 152 pivotal roles in setting up decentralised production 153 networks. The specifications for the production net-154 works are set by the large retailers or marketers that 155 source the goods. 
204 cannot be codified, while competent suppliers are 205 absent.
206
In between these extremes, modular value chains 207 arise when the specifications applying to more com-208 plex products are easily codified. Relational value 209 chains arise when specific knowledge is exchanged, 210 dealing with complex products and/or market infor-211 mation, and there is a low potential to codify product 212 specifications, while lead firms are motivated to 213 access suppliers with high capabilities. Finally, cap-214 tive value chains can arise when it is easy to codify 215 product specifications through detailed instructions in 216 the context of complex products and where there are 217 suppliers with lower capabilities. Low capability sup-218 pliers require instructions from lead firms, fostering 219 dependence and the lock-in of suppliers, while other 220 potential suppliers may be excluded from the benefits 221 of the lead firm's efforts. Suppliers incur significant 222 switching costs and are bcaptiveQ as inter-firm rela-223 tionships contain specific transactional assets. In cap-224 tive value chains, suppliers are often locked into 225 simple tasks such as production according to specifi-226 cation, while lead firms are involved in more complex 227 activities such as design, logistics, and process tech-228 nology upgrading.
229
This framework was developed in the context of 230 bicycles, apparel, fresh vegetables, and electronics 231 (Gereffi et al., 2003) . We will examine the value of 232 the framework in the context of explaining govern-233 ance in NTFP value chains. NTFPs are the subject of 234 great current interest among conservation and devel-235 opment organisations 236 Wollenberg and Ingles, 1998; Neumann and Hirsch, 237 2000) . Not only do they contribute to improving many 238 rural livelihoods but, where they are harvested in a 239 sustainable manner, they may also contribute to con-240 serving the resource (Belcher and Schreckenberg, 241 2003) . As more research is carried out on individual 242 NTFPs, there is growing awareness that the govern-243 ance structures that dominate NTFP value chains may 244 be highly inequitable, the best-known example being 245 the debt peonage of the wild rubber harvesters in the 246 Brazilian Amazon (Schwartzman, 1992) . Intermedi-247 aries or entrepreneurs are undoubtedly the most mal-248 igned actors in the value chain (Schreckenberg, 2003) .
249 Yet some studies suggest that the role of dmiddlemenT 250 has been underestimated (Padoch, 1992) and that it is 251 a mistake to try to bypass them (Corry, 1993, cited in 252 Neumann and Hirsch, 2000 (Gereffi, 1999) . 293 East Asian countries upgraded production processes 294 and functions (from simple assembly to marketing and 295 design) in the context of dtriangle manufacturingT, 296 whereby developed country buyers place orders with 297 East Asian countries, who in turn became successful 298 entrepreneurs and outsourced parts of the production 299 to low-wage countries (China, Indonesia, Vietnam). 300 East Asian countries are now much more involved in 301 design and other downstream functions. 302
However, other countries (e.g. Central American 303 countries) are locked into the upstream part of the 304 value chain with few incentives (from lead firms 305 lower down the chain) to upgrade. UNIDO (2002) 306 discusses the global value chain of wooden furniture 307 in South Africa where pine furniture has faced 308 increasing price competition putting pressures on 309 export prices. Products were also considered of low 310 quality and poor delivery reliability. The global buyer 311 in this captive value chain did not consider increasing 312 the efficiency of this manufacturing stage and 313 switched to more competitive East Asian suppliers, 314 while South Africa had to focus on a different value 315 chain using environmentally friendly wood (and 316 upgraded in that way).
317
Understanding the type of governance is important, 318 therefore, when developing policy and directing tech-319 nical assistance. Policy initiatives may affect a number 320 of firms more intensively when they are closely 321 related. Technical assistance programmes can be 322 made more efficient by targeting lead firms to the 323 benefit of suppliers upstream. Where there are a 324 small number of lead firms or individuals that control 325 a chain, there is a need for monitoring and perhaps 326 regulation to ensure that such firms or individuals are 327 not abusing their position of power within a chain. In 328 many developing countries, where NTFPs are impor-329 tant to poor families, such monitoring and regulation 330 policies are rarely well implemented. 
368
For each product a structured dmarketT report was 369 written based on a combination of secondary data 370 and key informant interviews. These reports 371 described the main market chains for the product, 372 beginning in the study communities and tracking 373 information as far downstream to the final consumer 374 as possible. As some of the products were marketed 375 in very different ways (e.g. fresh mushrooms for 376 local consumption, dried mushrooms for the 377 national market and fresh mushrooms for export), 
378 a total of 15 distinct value chains were examined 379 (see Table 2 ). 380 For each of the 18 communities in the study a struc-381 tured dcommunityT report was also written, based on 382 secondary information and data collected by partner 383 NGOs using participatory techniques (such as time-384 lines, resource mapping, wealth-ranking, Venn dia-385 grams) and key informant interviews. The data 386 collected covered a wide range of topics necessary 387 for the understanding of current patterns of resource 388 use and management, with a focus on the collection, 389 cultivation, processing and marketing of the case study 390 NTFP. Both the dmarketT and dcommunityT reports 391 were written by partner NGOs over a 2-year period 392 and finalised in 2003 after much interaction with the 393 project team, interim data analysis and supplementary 394 data collection.
395
A formal household questionnaire was designed to 396 collect data about the household, its use of the NTFP 397 including any costs and benefits incurred, and the 398 interviewee's perception of the household's success 399 and the contribution of NTFPs to their livelihood 400 strategy. During 2002/2003 the project's partner 401 NGOs applied the questionnaire to as many of the 402 households involved in NTFP activities in each com-403 munity as agreed to participate. Where more than 20 404 households were involved in NTFP activities, around 405 20 households were sampled on the basis of partici-406 patory wealth-ranking. In one community (Nueva 407 Santa Flor), trade had ceased as a fungal disease 408 had decimated the resource so no interviews were 409 carried out. In the remaining 17 communities, a total 410 of 289 households were interviewed. A further 117 411 control households not involved in the NTFP activ-412 ities were also interviewed. In addition 46 national 413 traders were interviewed using a slightly modified 414 version of the questionnaire. In practice this meant 415 that detailed information was not obtainable for 416 elements of the value chain that extended beyond 417 the national boundaries.
418
Data analysis included comparative text analysis of 419 the community reports, statistical representation and 420 regression analysis of the household data, and con-421 struction of value chains (on the basis of the house-422 hold data and the market reports) for each product. A 423 detailed presentation of the data collection and analy-424 sis methodology is provided in Schreckenberg et al. 425 (2005) . 
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505 and North American consumers. The value chain in 506 Mexico is dominated by one person, who is a repre-507 sentative of a North American importing company 508 and owner of a regional collection centre responsible 509 for collecting, selecting and exporting. In addition to 510 purchasing fronds from collectors of the wild palm 511 in the Monte Tinta community, the one-man com-512 pany cultivates and supplies half of the required 513 palm. This man has been important in developing 514 other markets for this NTFP in Europe and Japan 515 and his entrepreneurial activities have been key in 516 the general development of the Camedora palm 517 value chain in Mexico.
518 4.5. Profits along the chain
519
An alternative way to present a value chain is by 520 analysing the distribution of gains along the chain. 521 Without the objective of being representative or 522 complete for all NTFPs analysed, we computed 523 profits (revenues-costs) for three different actors in 524 the Matsutake mushroom chain as one example. 525 Information for collectors was obtained from the 526 household questionnaires, while data for the com-527 munity firm and entrepreneur came from discussions 528 with key informants. Table 3 shows that collectors, 529 the community firm and the exporter earn very 530 different profits. It was not possible to make esti-531 mates of the profits for Jipi Japa and Camedora 532 palm value chains. In the case of Jipi Japa, the 533 processing of the product into a large range of 534 differently valued items was such that calculating 535 a unit value of profit was not possible. In both 536 cases the strong position in the value chain of one 537 trader who, as pointed out by Padoch (1992) in her 538 seminal study of NTFP marketing in the Peruvian 539 Amazon, are notoriously difficult to interview, made 540 the collection of data to develop enterprise budgets 541 extremely difficult.
542
Governance of NTFP value chains
543
This section examines in more detail the govern-544 ance type of the different NTFP value chains and the 545 extent to which they are likely or predicted to be 546 governed by key entrepreneurs downstream from the 547 producer. Section 2 argued that three factors are t3.1 Gereffi et al. (2003) .
t4.21
b The maguey value chain is relational at the collector and community-based distilling level; but beyond this it becomes hierarchical in nature.
t4.22
c The latex rubber chain begins as a dmarketT type with many labourers available for hire by many rubber concessionaires. Once the latex is collected and moved to the La Paz workshops, the chain becomes more hierarchical. 
557
Below we explain how we interpreted these factors 558 for the case study value chains, basing our decisions 559 on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data 560 collected for the project. Table 4 then summarises the 561 knowledge transfer characteristics and governance 562 types of all the value chains.
563 5.1. Complexity of inter-firm information
564
While it would seem that NTFPs are fairly simple 565 products (although clearly that is not the case for some 566 of the products we researched, e.g. Jipi Japa woven 567 tourist artefacts), this misses an important point. The 568 complexity of products in the eyes of local collectors 569 and processors is not necessarily in the product itself, 570 but in the information required to successfully market 571 the NTFPs, i.e. complexity of inter-firm relationships. 572 Market information is often not readily available to 573 local collectors and they have few contacts further 574 downstream (e.g. how can local collectors establish 575 links with Japanese or American markets?). Hence, 576 selling NTFP products (to actors/consumers down-577 stream) is extremely complex for local collectors 578 and processors. 579 Evidence that this is so is provided by Chart 4, 580 based on analysis of household questionnaires, which 581 shows that market contacts and market information 582 were considered to be the most important barriers to 583 households selling NTFPs. Market knowledge and 584 contacts are important barriers for most products but 585 detailed project data show that this is particularly so 586 for Camedora palm and Matsutake mushrooms (in 587 Santa Maria Latuvi), so that the score in the first 588 column of Table 4 for most of these products is 589 bhighQ. 590 Another type of complexity is found in the cocoa 591 and maguey market chains, both of which have very 592 complex social webs close to the production end of 593 the chain. In the cocoa value chain, traders have Chart 4. Barriers to selling NTFPs, % of NTFP households answering yes. Source: te Velde et al. (2004) .
Governance types
736
In conclusion, the analysis of the local collectors 737 and traders for our case study NTFP value chains 738 suggests we can expect NTFPs to fall predominantly 739 into three of the governance types described by Ger-740 effi et al. (2003) 
757
The critical factor in determining the governance 758 type would appear to be the physical distance of the 759 consumer from the NTFP collector and the need for 760 specialised skills in processing, marketing and pre-761 sentation of the product.
762 The predictions for governance in value chains 763 based on the Gereffi typology relate very well to the 764 type of governance which occurs in practice. For 765 instance, Jipi Japa palm tourist items, exported mush-766 rooms and Camedora palm are characterised by a 767 bhighQ complexity of inter-firm information for 768 which there exists a bhighQ potential to codify, while 769 the capabilities of the local communities are consid-770 ered blowQ, so that the Gereffi typology would predict 771 a bcaptive value chainQ type of governance. This was 772 indeed what we found when we described these 773 chains in Section 4. 774 In spite of this concurrence between predicted and 775 actual type of governance, the Gereffi et al. (2003) 776 typology was not always easy to apply to the NTFP 777 cases. It is difficult to apply, for example, where 778 governance changes as you progress along the value 779 chain. This is the case for both maguey and latex 780 rubber, which become bhierarchicalQ as they approach 781 the consumer. The typology is also difficult to apply
F 827 (as did the lead firms in the textiles and garments 828 value chain in East Asia). Without them, the value 829 chain might either not have existed or entrepreneur-830 ship throughout the chain would be less advanced, 831 although in some instances there is evidence of a 832 block-inQ situation where suppliers are locked into 833 certain production functions while in other instances 834 potential suppliers are simply excluded from more 835 successful value chains (as in the case of pine furni-836 ture in South Africa). It is noted that these value 837 chains are relatively new (all less than 10 years) and 838 the concern that these individuals are abusing their 839 powerful position, or may limit future development of 840 the chain, is best examined product by product. 841 6.1. Jipi Japa
842
In the case of Jipi Japa palm, the dominant firm 843 is much more than a buyer and seller. It has a 844 quality control system, markets the products to 845 nationals and tourists, offers training to local wea-846 vers and provides several social functions such as 847 funds for housing development. This firm maintains 848 a high-trust relationship with local suppliers (the Jipi 849 Japa weavers), who have benefited through an 850 improvement in their production processes and 851 opportunities to sell their products. However, there 852 are a few negative aspects of this bcaptiveQ value 853 chain. The Jipi Japa firm demands only products that 854 fit into its shop (small, colourful and relatively cheap 855 Jipi Japa products perform an important function of 856 attracting tourists into the shop where they may go 857 on to purchase other much higher value artisanal 858 products) and suppliers are not encouraged to inno-859 vate and make higher value added products since the 860 firm lacks the marketing channels to sell these pro-861 ducts. The bswitching costsQ to alternative buyers by 862 the Jipi Japa processors would be high as there are 863 few about and none that could provide the same 864 level of non-income benefits (health care, training, 865 status, access to credit) that the association estab-866 lished by the Jipi Japa firm provides. Hence, while 867 the Jipi Japa firm has been essential for process 868 upgrading of existing products in the upstream part 869 of the value chain, it also stifles functional upgrad-870 ing upstream (i.e. marketing of higher value added 871 products). Further there is exclusion. The weavers in 872 one community, who are from a different ethnic 
